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Abstract 
 
This paper shows that exchange rate alignments are also used for the redistribution of 
income among different groups. The heterogeneous impacts of stabilization policies lead 
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groups. The model categorizes these various groups with respect to their shares in total 
production of tradables and nontradables. An increase in the relative prices of 
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The Role of Distribution of the Income Shares of Individuals in Tradables and 
Nontradables on Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Delay of Stabilizations 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decades, many developing countries have experienced business cycles 
associated with stabilization programs. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing 
countries especially Southern Cone Latin America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) and 
later in 1990s, Mexican Peso crisis and recently Turkish crises and Argentine crisis have 
some common characteristics in spite of their unique features. In almost all these crisis 
episodes, we observe failure in stabilization policies adopted to bring macroeconomic 
stability and especially to reduce inflation. Even though countries adopt different 
programs for macroeconomic stability, broad examination of these episodes suggests a 
common pattern. In almost all countries, we observe a large real exchange rate 
appreciation, a rise in the real wage rate and deterioration of current account and external, 
in some cases, domestic debt accumulation. However, these effects have not been 
sustained too long and often reversed with sudden stop of the economy, real exchange 
rate depreciation, fiscal contraction and severe repayment of stock of debt.  
This paper provides a political economy explanation for these empirical 
regularities. Individuals in the economy seem to be affected differently from any 
stabilization policy. The individuals are categorized with respect to their income as the 
poor, the rich and the middle class. Moreover, these three groups of individuals earn their 
income from tradables and nontradables. Since the stabilization policies alter the prices of 
tradables and nontradables, the stabilization policies affect the earnings of various groups 
asymmetrically. This paper shows that exchange rate alignments are used for the 
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redistribution of income among different groups. Majority voting determines the choice 
of particular economic policies. However, maximization of self-interest for a particular 
type of individuals contradicts with the interest of other types of individuals. Certain 
types of agents form coalitions and maximize their utilities at the expense of others. This 
paper unravels that low and high income individuals benefit from the overvaluation of 
exchange rate and they form a coalition to increase the prices of nontradables and to 
delay the repayment of external debt with even further borrowing. 
The model incorporates four key factors that give rise to populist stabilization 
cycles: (i) various coalitions are formed and later coalitions are shifted (ii) some of the 
factors are more mobile than others and can leave the country in the long run without 
incurring the cost economic policies (iii) the exchange rate policy is endogenous to 
distribution of tradables and nontradables in the economy (iv) the external debt 
repayment is delayed and even further borrowing occurs to raise the incomes of particular 
group of individuals at the expense of other groups. At the end, we also show that higher 
inequality generates higher probability of unsustainable economic programs especially in 
poor countries.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of 
the literature to explain the stabilization experiences of many developing countries in 
recent decades as an attempt to form a bridge among various approaches. Section III 
presents the model and in section IV, a benchmark case of homogeneous agents model is 
illustrated. In section V, heterogeneity in the income shares of tradables and nontradables 
is introduced without factor mobility. In section VI, the solutions to heterogeneous agents 
model in the presence of factor mobility is discussed. Section VII focuses on the role 
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inequality in the adoption of macroeconomic policies. Section VIII discusses a modified 
model with financial frictions to better account for the rich-poor coalition and last section 
concludes. 
2. Motivation and the Literature Review 
Above-mentioned boom-bust cycles have been a subject of an extensive research 
program. Dornbush (1982) and Rodriguez (1982) suggested that an initial fall in the real 
interest rate due to adaptive expectations generates an expansion in the economy. The fall 
in the rate of devaluation exceeds the fall in inflation and this in turn creates lower real 
interest rates. Later, temporariness hypothesis (Calvo (1986)) emphasizes the role of lack 
of credibility in the sense that the public expects the program to be discontinued in the 
future. Temporary reduction in nominal interest rate leads to intertemporal substitution of 
future consumption with today’s consumption. Calvo and Vegh (1993) introduce the 
nontraded goods and sticky prices to show how noncredible stabilization policies bring a 
gradual appreciation of currency.  
 Helpman and Razin (1987) emphasize the role of fiscal policy and suggest that 
reduction in inflation generates a wealth effect and thus economic expansion in the 
absence of :Ricardian equivalence. Drazen and Helpman (1988) later attribute the wealth 
effect to the expectation of a future reduction in government spending.  
Later attempts to explain the stylized facts of stabilization programs point out the 
supply side effects that may result from removing the inflationary distortion on labor 
supply or capital accumulation [Roldos (1995) and Uribe (1997)]. This supply-side 
approach claims that reduction in the rate of depreciation of currency can lead to real 
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appreciation, boom in economic activity and deterioration of current account due to 
reduction in inflation-induced distortions.  
Rebelo and Vegh (1996) introduce a unified framework to test these alternative 
hypothesis and they show that at the qualitative level no single hypothesis is ample to 
account for all empirical regularities and at the quantitative level, they are unable to 
explain the magnitudes of observed real appreciations and consumption booms [see also 
Reinhart and Vegh (1995)].  
In an attempt to account for disparities between theoretical models and empirical 
regularities, Calvo and Drazen (1998) focus on the role of uncertainty and incomplete 
contingent claim markets and illustrate gradual consumption boom.  
More recently, Mendoza and Uribe (2000) use a general equilibrium model of a 
two-sector, small open economy in which agents expect a devaluation and a switch to a 
higher rate of depreciation of currency and they show that risk of devaluation induces 
large distortions on wealth and relative prices under incomplete insurance market 
settings. Their model generates macroeconomic dynamics that mimic some important 
features of stabilization programs implemented in many developing countries.  
These recent attempts are quite important contributions to the literature because 
they not only better account for the quantitative regularities of data, but also draw 
attention to the imperfect credit markets like liquidity and collateral constraints [Mendoza 
(2000-a-b)], [Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999)]. In spite of all the progress in 
explaining main characteristics of stabilization programs, our understanding of economic 
forces behind the business cycles associated with stabilization programs are still quite 
limited.  
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Overall, these macroeconomic approaches to uncover the dynamics of 
stabilization programs share a common feature of homogeneous agents in the economy. 
However, the homogeneous agent assumption ignores the political and institutional 
dimensions of actual experiences of countries concerned. Hence, the sole macroeconomic 
approaches are criticized by Acemoglu et al. (2002) by claiming that often blamed poor 
macroeconomic performances and distortionary macroeconomic policies are symptoms 
rather than main causes for the impacts of institutions on economic instability. They use 
settler mortality as an instrument for the institutional development and show that 
macroeconomic policies appear to have only minor impact on volatility and crises once 
institutional development is controlled. Hence, Acemoglu et al. suggest that adoption of 
certain macroeconomic policies is endogenous to the institutions prevailing in the society. 
This kind of endogenous macroeconomic policy approach has been also suggested by 
Rodrik in explaining the different reactions to global shocks in 1970s. Rodrik (1999) 
concludes that countries with weak institutions are unable to deal with major global 
shocks taking place during the 1970s and experience disappointing growth performance 
during 1980s and 1990s (see also Easterly 2001)]. Moreover, Rodrik (1999) attributes the 
success of adoption of macroeconomic adjustments to deeper social determinants and 
show how social conflicts and their management played a key role in transmitting the 
effects of external shocks onto economic performance.  
This study draws attention on the importance of heterogeneity of agents in the 
economy and attempts to form a bridge between the political economy and open 
economy macroeconomics explanations of stabilization programs. The macroeconomic 
approaches with homogeneous agent assumption miss an important point. Inflation 
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reduction may be socially painless process under identical agents settings. However, in 
reality agents are heterogeneous in many respects and therefore it is hard to believe that 
all individuals in the society are affected equally from the stabilization policies. It is more 
likely that some groups of individuals depending on their different characteristics are hurt 
more than other sets of people in the economy. The simplest example is that fiscal 
adjustment required in almost all the stabilization programs are not easy to implement 
considering the asymmetric burden of fiscal contractions on various individuals in the 
society. Since different fiscal adjustments have different implications for various groups 
in the economy, it is hard to reach a wide consensus on any particular policy. This kind of 
conflict of interest further leads to delayed stabilization or adoption of incomplete 
stabilization programs which rationalize the inflation persistence and prevalence of short-
lived stabilization programs experienced by many developing countries in recent decades.  
This conflict of interest in heterogeneous agents economy is recognized by the 
political economy literature and generates numerous research on the delay of stabilization 
and adoption of incomplete stabilization policies. Interaction of two groups trying to 
minimize their own share in the cost of adjustment is formalized as a “war attrition” 
game by Alesina and Drazen (1991). Each group has incomplete information on the cost 
of adjustment of the other group. The group that concedes before the other group loses 
and bears the burden of stabilization more. Given the imperfect information, each group 
prefers to wait and learn the cost of their opponents. At the end, group suffering more 
from the existing distortions concedes and stabilization is realized with a delay and 
disproportionate burden of stabilization falls on the group that concedes first. The delay 
of the reform is also explained as a status quo bias in the existence uncertainty about the 
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winners and losers of the reform by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Later, Laban and 
Sturzenegger (1995) show that deteriorating conditions can generate a case that necessary 
reforms are first not adopted, but, as fundamental conditions get deteriorated further over 
time, necessary stabilization policies take place with delay. Velasco (1998) approaches 
the unsustainable policies and delay of necessary reforms to stabilize the economy as a 
“common pool” problem and considers two groups regarding fiscal resources as a 
common pool. These groups do not fully internalize the cost of financing government 
expenditure until debt accumulates and the cost of non-cooperative equilibrium reaches 
to critical level inducing both groups to act cooperatively and improve the fiscal stance. 
Above-mentioned institutional and political economy approaches share a common 
feature that is absent in the macroeconomic explanations of stylized facts of stabilization 
programs in the developing countries. This feature is the heterogeneity of agents in the 
economy. Institutional and political economy approaches emphasize the role played by 
the distributional implications of stabilization policies on various social groups in the 
economy and take these factors into consideration to diagnose the reasons of often failed 
stabilization programs of less developed countries. Hence, the dynamics of societies and 
the distributional consequences of various policies on different groups need to be 
analyzed to have a better understanding of stylized facts of stabilization policies.  
At the very basic level, a society is composed of people with varying levels of 
income. As it is documented by Baldacci et al (2002), the poor, rich and middle-income 
classes are not equally affected by stabilization policies. Therefore by recognizing the 
heterogeneity of agents, this paper suggests a political economy model to explain the 
stylized business cycles in developing countries.  
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2.1. How the poor are affected by the stabilization programs and the boom-bust 
cycles in developing countries  
The boom-bust cycles of stabilization programs generate higher real wage and 
employment in the initial phases of stabilization programs. However, later in the program 
or after the program ends with a crisis, wages fall and unemployment rise. During the 
period 1997-98 real wages fell by 4.5 percent in Thailand and 10.6 percent in Korea and 
44 percent in Indonesia [Agenor (2002)]. In 1998, unemployment rate rose to 5.3 percent 
from 2.2 percent in Thailand. In Korea, the urban unemployment rate rose to 8.4 percent 
in 1999 from 2.6 percent in 1997. In general, the poor are disproportionately affected by 
crises and poverty headcount index increased after the crises. Since the low-income 
groups and the poor generally involve in the production with their labor force, until 
stabilization programs are abandoned, low-income people enjoy higher real wage and 
employments. Hence, it seems to be the case that the low-income people benefit from 
existing conditions prior to major crises. Likewise we also observe that all the groups 
enjoy the benefits of existing circumstances before crises. However, some agents later 
pay the cost of stabilization programs more than the others.  
Exchange rate realignment associated with abandonment of stabilization program 
results in relative price changes, likely to affect some social groups more adversely than 
others. Stabilization programs are largely characterized by the appreciation of currency 
before stabilization programs are abandoned. Stabilization programs therefore generally 
end with the discrete depreciation of currency. The appreciation of currency represents 
higher relative prices of nontradables in terms of tradables. This further implies that 
stabilization programs with overvalued currencies increases production of nontradables 
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relative to production of tradables. After the devaluation of currency however, the price 
and production of nontradables fall relative to the tradables. When the stabilization 
program is in effect with overvalued exchange rate, the low-income people tend to  
benefit from the higher real wages and employment if they have higher share in the  
nontradables as compared to tradables, which is shown by Uribe (1995). Uribe estimates 
that the labor share in the nontradable sector is more (0.63) than tradable sector (0.48), a 
feature consistent with our model. 
Considering the fact that low-income people provide their labor services to the 
economy, it is more likely that low-income individuals are among the main beneficiaries 
of stabilization programs that bring higher wages and employment.  Take for instance the 
temporariness hypothesis, the stabilization program is expected to be reversed in the 
future. Government starts with a hope to continue the stabilization policy for a long time, 
but later realizes that the economy needs realignment with the appreciated currency. 
Politicians may not be able to adjust the overheated economy due to the pressures from 
different groups in the society benefiting from existing circumstances. This pattern may 
induce the politicians to postpone the necessary adjustments. Eventually the economy 
ends up with high devaluations, unemployment and with a sudden stop of the economy 
[Calvo and Reinhart (2000)]. It is apparent that this process stems from the lack of 
incentives on the part of low and high-income people to bear the burden of economic 
adjustment. 
The low income groups moreover object to certain reforms associated with 
realignments of the economy that requires them to move to different sectors. However 
given their lack of education and low skills, they are more likely to prefer to postpone the 
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reforms as long as possible due to status quo bias, high risk aversion or asymmetric 
information.  
In addition to the higher shares of low income people in the nontradable 
production, overvalued currency allows the low income people to purchase tradable 
goods with relatively cheaper prices and this in turn increases their standards of living at 
least for a certain period of time. In spite of the eventual reality that the crisis is going to 
hit the low-income people, given the low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, this 
mechanism works for the low-income people more than it works for the other groups of 
people.  
Recent literature on open economy macroeconomics draws attention to the credit 
market imperfections. This credit market imperfection is also not symmetric in the 
society. An increase in the prices of nontradable goods increases the collaterals used to 
insure lending. A fall in real interest rate also provides more credit opportunities for some 
of the previously credit constraint households. These sorts of credit imperfections are 
more prevalent for the low-income people. They are among the first to get rid of 
borrowing constraints like collateral constraints and to benefit from the net worth effects 
with the introduction of stabilization programs. Therefore, stabilization programs help the 
low-income people to avoid the financial frictions possibly more than any other groups.   
Last, but not the least, even the direct benefits of avoiding the financial frictions 
are incurred by the firms, indirectly the low-income people enjoy the benefits in the form 
of higher wages and employment. For example, in many developing countries small and 
medium size firms benefit from the credit expansions and eliminations of financial 
frictions. Considering that small and medium size enterprises tend to use more labor-
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intensive production technologies, an expansion in the output and employment induced 
by the increase in availability of credit indirectly helps the low-income groups by 
boosting the wages and employment [see Agenor (2002)].  
3. The Model 
The model is based on three different types of groups of agents in the economy. 
These different groups form various coalitions depending on the distributions of their 
income shares in tradables and nontradables. Exchange rate alignment is used as a 
mechanism for income redistribution. Since different groups are affected asymmetrically 
from exchange rate policies, coalitions representing the majority of the population decide 
on the tax rate, exchange rate and timing of debt repayment and moreover on the amount 
of additional debt.  
A model with an idea of groups having conflicting interests has been introduced 
by Perotti (1996) to explain seemingly unsustainable fiscal policies arising from a 
coalition of the poor and rich when distribution of income is highly unequal. His model 
employs a fiscal policy that redistributes the income from the middle and high income 
classes to the poor. In relatively poor countries, the rich leave the country in the second 
period and this enables the poor to form a coalition with the rich and eventually to 
postpone all the payment of stock of debt to the second period in which only middle class 
pays all the tax and stock of debt. In this respect, our model carries the same idea of the 
poor and rich coalition to generate inconsistent macroeconomic policies. However, in our 
model the purpose is to explain appreciation of currency before stabilization along with 
further borrowing. Moreover, in practice, fiscal policy of transfer does not seem to be the 
main mechanism used for the redistribution of income. In our model, the redistribution of 
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income is achieved through increasing prices of goods produced by the targeted groups of 
redistribution. This price mechanism for the redistribution of income better mimics the 
stabilization experiences of many less developed countries. Unlike Perotti (1996), our 
model recognizes the significance of income shares of individuals in total tradables and 
nontradables and makes the income distribution as a function of tradable and nontradable 
income.  
In addition to altering relative prices for redistribution, our model allows us to 
show why countries borrow more in spite of their existing stock of debt and high interest 
cost associated with extra borrowing. Without loss of generality, our model characterizes 
this pattern as domestic borrowing when country reaches its limit in external borrowing.  
We also consider the mobility of some groups like Perotti (1996) and Alesina and 
Tabellini (1989) to capture capital flights associated with failure of stabilization programs 
and crises in general. 
3.1. Technology and Preferences 
The model incorporates two period economy. The first period can be regarded as 
initial stages of stabilization programs and the second period resembles the end of 
stabilization programs or period after crises that brings the end of existing stabilization 
program. The economy is endowed with two types of goods: tradables and nontradables. 
Agents take the utility from tradables and nontradables and all types of the agents have 
the same utility function and budget constraint is satisfied in each period. 
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Where CT and CN represent the consumption of tradables and nontradables 
respectively. YNi and YTi denote the endowment of tradables and nontradables for agent i, 
respectively. PN indicates the price of nontradables in terms of tradables and price of 
tradables is normalized to one. Lastly, in each period, consumption of nontradables is 
equal to the total endowment of nontradables in each period.  
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The function )( jCU , j: T or N is bounded from below to have preference 
ordering over different consumption profiles. The inverse of elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution, γ, is less than 1. For simplicity, discount factor is taken to be equal to 1.  
3.2. Income Distribution 
The population is comprised of total mass 1 of different agents, divided into three 
groups: poor,P, middle,M,  and rich,R. Any single group does not constitute majority. 
Hence, when all the population involves in the voting, single group does not have the 
majority of population. Without loss of generality, the model treats the different groups 
as if they have the same share, 1/3, of population. We also assume that when only the 
poor and middle class vote, the offer of middle class wins.  
To capture the idea of redistribution, the model assumes that agents P do not have 
income from tradables. Therefore, the agents P attempt to raise the relative price of 
nontradables to maximize their income. To simplify the model, we assume that the 
income of tradables and nontradables is given as an endowment to isolate the shift of the 
labor force between tradables and nontradables as relative prices change.  
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3.3. Redistributive Policy 
The exchange rate overvaluation combined with the fiscal policy is used as a 
redistributive mechanism.  Redistribution of income among various groups is realized 
through increasing the relative price of nontradables. Since different groups have 
different shares in nontradables, exchange rate alignments have asymmetric impacts on 
various groups. The cost of increase in the price of nontradables is paid by taxing the 
tradable goods. For simplicity, the model assumes that only income from tradable goods 
is taxed. Given that middle and rich classes have income from tradable goods; the poor 
only benefit from higher taxation and increasing prices of nontradables good. In period j, 
income from tradable goods is taxed at a flat rate tj, the revenue collected [tj*(YtM + YtR)] 
is then redistributed among people making their income from nontradable goods. Hence 
the rich pay (tj*YtR) and receive their share times total tax collected. 
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Similarly, middle class pays (tj*YtM) and receives their share in nontradables 
times total tax collected.  
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Finally, the poor are not exposed to any taxation and receive the following: 
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The tax revenue is used to finance the increase in exchange rate defined as prices 
of nontradables over price of tradables. Hence, individuals receive transfer proportional 
to their share of nontradables in total nontradables.  
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In practice, individuals generally receive their income either from tradable (T) or 
nontradable (NT) sectors. However this doesn’t imply that income from T and NT sectors 
are uncorrelated. A shock in T (NT) sectors influences the NT (T) sectors and leads to 
changes in earnings of individuals in other sectors. Individuals in the economy mainly 
receive their income in the form of labor earnings, profit and/or rent. To illustrate how 
income in T and NT sectors are correlated, consider a negative shock in NT sectors, this 
shock reduces the labor income not only in NT sectors but in T sectors. Hence, when we 
assume that individuals receive their income from T and NT goods, this can be regarded 
as such that an individual’s earning is correlated with the value of T and NT goods.  
Since the poor earn their income mostly from their labor force, we expect that 
their share in nontradables is greater than the shares of other groups in nontradables. 
Income of the middle class comes both from tradables and nontradables. Middle class is 
more likely to have more human capital and to work in tradable sectors. Moreover, 
middle class is likely to have some capital (money) to invest. Therefore we expect that 
middle class receive income both from tradables and nontradables. The rich, on the other 
hand, are expected to have more capital and earn most of their income from renting or 
investing their capital instead of receiving most of their income through their labor force. 
Hence, the model assumes the following shares of tradables and nontradables for three 
groups.  
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The results of the model do not rely on this assumption. What is crucial for the 
model is the different cost and benefit of taxation and redistribution for three types of 
agents. Moreover, this cost and benefit merely depend on their shares of nontradables and 
tradables in overall production. Individuals with higher share of income in nontradables 
relative to tradables prefer higher taxation and redistribution given that their benefit 
outweighs the cost of taxation. Hence, preferred tax rate of these individuals is the 
maximum possible tax rate,1 and corresponding exchange rate.  
Due to lack of distortions from taxation, the optimal tax rate for any individual in 
this set up is either zero or one depending on their endowment of tradables and 
nontradables. In order to keep the model simple, we do not allow any distortion from 
taxation. If taxation leads to distortion then maximum tax rate, 1 can be eliminated.  
3.4. Debt Payment and Further Borrowing  
In this model, country may need two types of stabilizations as the devaluation of 
domestic currency and the debt repayment. Economy starts with an initial stock of debt; 
R and depending on the political decision given by majority, the government can 
appreciate the value of domestic currency in the first period. In the second period, 
exchange rate can be realigned to its real value and country must fulfill all the debt 
obligations by the end of second period. Thus the tax collected is allocated to either debt 
repayment or redistribution. Rj denotes the amount of repayment in period j and t(Rj) 
indicates the tax rate that raises an amount of tax revenue just equal to  Rj. 
In order to capture the domestic debt phenomenon, it is assumed that country 
already reached the limit of external borrowing and additional borrowing can only be 
done in domestic markets with an extra interest cost of r. Hence, the interest rate for the 
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existing stock of debt is normalized to zero but one more unit of debt costs r units for the 
country. Moreover, we assume that only the rich have access to lend to the government. 
This assumption is made for the simplicity to reflect the idea that domestic borrowing can 
be beneficial for individuals with higher liquid assets.  
If the private agents are allowed to lend and borrow in international markets to 
smooth their consumption, the model generates an interesting and realistic two way flow 
of resources with private flow going in opposite direction to official flows. However, in 
the model, private flows are restricted by introducing full capital control over private 
flows. This is not again crucial for the results of the model but allows us to focus on 
central issues.   
Because of zero interest rate for stock of external debt, R and zero rate of time 
preference, representative agents would maximize their utilities by dividing debt 
repayment in two periods equally. Thus, in the model if less than half of the debt is repaid 
in the first period or even further borrowing occurs in the first period, then this is 
considered to be a delay of stabilization.  
3.5. Political System 
In the first period, agents decide on the tax rate t1, and amount of debt repayment, 
R1 and domestic debt, D. The redistributive transfer in the form of overvalued currency is 
endogenous to tax revenue, current debt repayment and domestic borrowing. In the 
second period economy pays all of its remaining debt, R2=(R-R1) and domestic debt with 
the interest cost D*(1+r). In the second period, therefore, only policy decided on the basis 
of majority voting is the tax rate, t2.  
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In the model, the issues are not voted separately. Hence there can be a problem of 
stable-winner. However, the model incorporates three types of agents and this in turn 
ensures the finite number of proposals maximizing the utility of each type of agents. In 
other words, agents are assumed to give proposals that are best for them. Necessary and 
sufficient condition for a proposal to be stable winner is to defeat the other two in pair-
wise comparison. The model assumes that each agent proposes the policy that maximizes 
his utility and votes sincerely. Strategic voting is not analyzed in this set up due to the 
complications associated with the definition of equilibrium and endogeneity of outcomes 
to allowable strategies. However, in this particular model, results are not expected to 
change drastically with the introduction of strategic voting. Since each proposal 
maximizes the utility of at least two types of agents, this eliminates the effects of strategic 
voting. Hence, each group of agents does not have any incentive to make a different 
proposal. 
In each period, initial stock of debt can be repaid in full. Thus, if all the debt 
payment is postponed to the second period, there is a maximum domestic debt, Dmax that 
can be incurred by the government in the first period.             
3.6. Mobility and Capital Flight 
The agents are allowed to move abroad in the long run. In the second period, 
nontradable endowment is not mobile, but agents can transfer their income from tradable 
goods to aboard. The level of development of the rest of the world relative to home 
country is represented by productivity variable, A. So, we simply assume the level of 
development is 1 in home country. If the rest of the world is more productive, A takes the 
value greater than 1 and if home country is more productive than the rest of the world 
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then A should be less than 1.  This will enable us to distinguish the characteristics of the 
rich and poor countries. When agents move their tradable goods, they have to pay a fixed 
cost; f associated with the mobility of tradable goods. Hence, if an agent leaves the 
country in the second period income from his tradable goods becomes AYTi-f. Hence, 
mobility of tradables in the second period depends both on the relative productivity of 
home country and fixed cost, f. The individuals left the country in the second period are 
not kept responsible to pay the tax and they also do not involve in decision process in the 
second period. This assumption makes sense considering the political power exercised by 
each group at different times. It is more likely that the rich constitute a small fraction of 
total population. However, their political power comes not only from their number but 
also from other sources like campaign contributions etc. Hence, it is reasonable to think 
that the rich use their political power in the first period and remain indifferent in the 
second period as long as they are not affected.  
Individuals compare the utility of leaving the country with staying in the country 
to maximize their pay offs.  For example, the rich leave the country under the following 
condition:  
YTR[(1-t2(R2+D)]< AYTR-f 
RHS represents the income from tradables abroad minus the cost of moving and LHS 
represents the income from tradables net of taxes at home country in the second period.  
The tradable goods are generally more mobile and this mobility of more mobile 
factors generates a chance to avoid the cost of consolidation and to shift the burden of 
stabilization on the agents staying in the country.  
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The next section first introduces the benchmark case of homogeneous agent 
economy, and then focuses on the different dynamics of heterogeneous agents in rich 
countries and poor countries (more/less productive as compared to the rest of the world). 
4. The Homogeneous Agent Economy 
Agents in our model differ with respect to their endowment in tradables and in 
nontradables. Homogeneous economy, therefore, represents the case with no income 
dispersion in tradables and nontradables. Each individual in the economy has identical 
amount of tradables and nontradables. Homogeneous agents version of the model 
necessitates no fiscal and redistributive policy because any tax revenue from an agent is 
redistributed back without any net loss for the agents. Hence the proposition I follows: 
Proposition I: when all the agents own same amount of tradable and nontradable 
income, there is no incentive for the agents to appreciate the currency and to delay the 
debt repayment in order to redistribute the income. The external debt repayment is 
spread equally in two periods without further borrowing and thus consumption 
smoothing is achieved. 
Proof: since all the agents are identical, agents receive amount of transfer exactly equal 
to what they pay as taxes. Therefore, they are indifferent to any tax rate and any fiscal 
policy to raise the prices of nontradables. Other policy variables decided are the amount 
of debt repayment in each period and additional borrowing in the first period. Since 
agents are identical, all the agents leave or stay in the country in the second period. If 
agents leave, all the debt repayment must be done in the first period. If agents stay in the 
country, the strategy to pay half of the debt in each period dominates any other strategy 
because it provides consumption smoothing for identical agents.  
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In the presence of sufficiently high fixed cost of moving, nobody leaves the 
country in the second period and utility of agents are maximized when consumption is 
smoothed perfectly across two periods. Therefore, in the first period, appropriate tax rate 
is set just to pay half of the stock of debt and also no domestic borrowing is done to 
appreciate the domestic currency. Other half of the debt is paid in the second period. 
Since there is no effort to raise the price of nontradables for redistributive purposes, 
exchange rate remains stable over the periods. In the model, deviations from real 
exchange rate are not distortionary. Therefore changes in relative prices of nontradables 
do not bring any disutility to homogeneous agents. However, we assume that under these 
conditions agents prefer not to change the exchange rate due to potential distortions 
associated with volatility of exchange rate, which are not modeled in this set up.  
When agents in the economy are treated as homogeneous, there is no business 
cycle: the cost of stabilization is spread over the two periods for rational, forward-looking 
individuals. However once we recognize the heterogeneity of agents in the economy with 
respect to their income, the model generates interesting pattern of overvalued exchange 
rate and delayed debt repayment with extra borrowing in the first period.  
5. Heterogeneous Agent Economy 
 Since agents R have more endowment in tradables than agents M in the second 
period; when the agents M find it optimal to leave the country, agents R leave the country 
as well. But if both groups of agents M and R leave in the second period, all the debt 
should be repaid in the first period. However, this is not an interesting case to consider.  
Therefore we analyze two situations: one is nobody leaves the country in the second 
period and the other is only agents R leave the country in the long run. This part is 
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devoted to the first case: nobody leaves the country because of two possible reasons: 
either the cost of moving can be high enough to deter the agents to take their tradable 
goods outside the country or the rest of the world can be less productive than home 
country so that it becomes worthy to stay in more productive country in spite of taxation 
and debt obligations in the second period.  
5.1. Heterogeneous Agent Economy When the Rich Do Not Leave the Country 
Even economy is populated by heterogeneous agents with respect to their shares 
in total tradables and nontradables, when the rich don’t leave the country we don’t 
observe business cycles with devaluations and delay of debt repayments.  
Proposition II: When the rich don’t leave the country, exchange rate is stable over 
time without devaluation in the second period. The external debt repayment is spread 
equally in two periods without much domestic borrowing.  
Proof: All the cases are considered below.  Let’s consider the income shares of each 
group in tradables and nontradables one by one:  
Case I: 
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Case I considers the situation that share of nontradables of agents M is less than 
their share of tradables in overall tradable production. Whether agents R leave the 
country in the second period is common information to all the players. Therefore agents 
M propose zero tax rate in both periods because they pay more than they receive in the 
form of higher prices of nontradables. As a consequence of zero preferred taxation, the 
relative price of nontradables-exchange rate- is desired to be stable over time. Further 
borrowing is not desired because it only helps increase the price of nontradables at the 
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expense of lower consumption in the second period. The repayment of external stock of 
debt is spread in two periods equally.  
Case II: 
)(
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This case is opposite of case I.  Agents M have higher share in overall nontradable 
production as compared to their share in overall tradable production. Hence, agents M 
receive more from increasing price of nontradables than what they pay as a tax. Therefore 
the optimum tax rate happens to be maximum tax rate 1 for agents M.  
Since nobody leaves in the second period, domestic borrowing with interest rate r 
only reduces the welfare. Thus, agents M propose zero domestic debt in the first period. 
They also want to spread the repayment of existing stock of debt in two periods equally, 
R1=R2=R/2. 
The exchange rate as a function of fiscal policy appears to be stable over time and 
equal to 
b
RaPP N
O
N
2/−=− where a=YTM+ YTR and b= YNP+ YNM+ YNR 
PNO represents the overvalued prices of nontradables and PN denotes the real value 
of nontradables. Hence, [(PNO- PN)/ PN] is the rate of overvaluation of exchange rate. 
However, we do not observe any proposed devaluation in the second period. So exchange 
rate is stable over time.  
Now let’s consider the shares of tradables and nontradables of agents R. There 
can be again two possibilities.  
Case III: 
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The share of tradables of agents R in overall tradables production exceeds their 
share of nontradables in overall nontradable production. This is more likely the case 
considering that the rich earn income more from their capital than from their labor force.   
Since the cost of taxation exceeds the benefit of redistribution agents R prefer 
zero tax rate along with equal spread of debt repayment in two periods. If only agents R 
are allowed to lend in the first period, they lend up to DmaxIII that should satisfy the 
following condition so that the rich find it beneficial to lend in the first period:  
)(*)(max b
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Case IV: 
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Case IV supposes that nontradables’ share of agents R in overall nontradables 
exceeds their share of tradables. Under these conditions, the optimal proposal for the rich 
is the tax rate of 1 and R is again spread in two periods. Domestic lending by agents R is 
maximum debt that can be repaid in the second period because now agents R benefit 
from increase in prices of nontradables in addition to their benefit in the form of interest 
revenue in the second period. Moreover, no devaluation takes place in the second period. 
The Poor 
For agents P, the optimum choice is more limited. Since they receive their income 
only from nontradables without exposed to any taxation, they prefer to increase the prices 
of nontradables as much as possible. Therefore they offer tax rate 1 in each period and 
external debt is repaid in two periods equally. Domestic debt is preferred to be zero 
because nobody leaves in the second period and higher consumption with higher 
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domestic debt implies higher repayment with an interest cost and lower consumption in 
the second period.  
Next, we consider possible combinations of all these cases.  
Case I with Case III: 
b
M
NY < 
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY < 
a
R
TY  
This is most likely combination of cases to encounter. The agents decides by pair-
wise comparison, then the proposal of agents M is to be accepted because agents R prefer 
proposal of agents M over proposal agents P and agents P prefer proposal of agents M to 
the proposal agents R. The rich and middle class coalition wins with the following 
agenda: 
t1([R+ D]/2)=t2([R+ D]/2), R1=R2=(R+D)/2, D=0   
b
DRaPP N
O
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2/)( +−=−  
where t([R+ D]/2) denotes tax rate needed to raise tax revenue just equal to debt 
repayment of [R+ D ]/2 in each period 
Case I with Case IV: 
b
M
NY < 
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY > 
a
R
TY  
Now proposal of agents P beats the proposals of agents M and R in pair-wise 
competition. Agents R prefer the proposal of agents P because it offers tax rate 1 and 
equal spread of external debt repayment. Only difference between proposals of agents P 
and R is that agents P offer zero domestic debt as opposed to DmaxIII offered by agents R. 
Agents M prefer offer of agents P because at least it offers zero domestic debt as 
compared to the proposal of agents R with DmaxIII . Exchange rate is again stable and 
equal to   PNO- PN = (a-R/2)/b, and the winning agenda is: 
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t1= t2=1, R1=R2=R/2, D=0 
Case II with Case III: 
b
M
NY > 
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY < 
a
R
TY  
Agents P and M make the same offer therefore their offer is accepted with the 
following agenda: 
t1= t2 =1, R1=R2=R/2, D=0, PNO- PN=(a-R/2)/b 
 
We do not again observe exchange rate fluctuations over time.   
Case II with Case IV: 
b
M
NY > 
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY > 
a
R
TY  
 
This combination of cases is impossible given that it leads to total shares of agents 
M and R in nontradables to be greater than 1. 
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TABLE: 1 
The rich don’t leave in the 
second period 
Case III: 
b
R
NY < 
a
R
TY   Case IV: 
b
R
NY > 
a
R
TY  
Case I: 
b
M
NY < 
a
M
TY  
 
 
rich-middle coalition 
proposal of the middle class wins 
stable exchange rate 
t1([R+ D]/2)=t2([R+ D]/2), 
R1=R2=(R+D)/2, D= 0 
b
DRaPP N
O
N
2/)( +−=−  
 
rich-poor coalition 
proposal of the poor wins 
stable exchange rate 
 t1= t2=1, R1=R2=R/2, D=0,  
b
RaPP N
O
N
2/−=−  
Case II: 
b
M
NY > 
a
M
TY  
poor-middle coalition 
proposal of the poor and middle 
class is same and wins 
stable exchange rate 
t1= t2 =1, R1=R2=R/2, D=0,  
 
b
RaPP N
O
N
2/−=−  
 
Impossible 
 
6. Heterogeneous Agent Model When the Rich Leave the Country  
Whenever fixed cost of moving abroad is small enough to make leaving more 
profitable strategy in the second period, the rich leave to benefit from higher productivity 
in the rest of the world and avoid taxation and debt repayment in the second period. 
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Hence the model predicts higher capital flight in poor countries and in countries with 
small cost associated with leaving the country like no capital control.  
Proposition III: when the rich leave the country in the second period, the poor and 
rich form a coalition in the first period. The currency is appreciated in the first period 
and all the debt repayment is delayed to the second period with additional domestic 
borrowing.  
Proof: all the possible cases and their implications are considered below.  
Case I with Case III: 
b
M
NY < 
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY < 
a
R
TY  
Since the rich leave in the second period and this is common information for all 
the agents in the economy. Agents M want all the external stock of debt to be repaid in 
the first period. Otherwise all the burden of the debt repayment falls on them in the 
second period. Agents M also lose more from taxation than what they receive as an 
increase in prices of nontradables. Therefore, they offer tax rate just enough to pay R, 
t1(R) in the first period and zero tax rate in the second period and full payment of debt 
with no further borrowing in the first period.  
For agents R, net benefit of taxation and redistribution is negative. Hence, they 
propose zero tax rate. Moreover they want all the stock of external debt to be paid in the 
second period so that they do not need to pay any debt by fleeing the country in the 
second period. On the other hand, they are better off by lending to the government 
because they can earn interest revenue in addition to increased prices of nontradables in 
the first period. 
Under these conditions agents P want to maximize prices of nontradables in two 
periods. However since the agents R leave the country in the second period, proposal of 
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agents M is accepted in the second period. Given that agents M offer zero tax rate in the 
second period, redistribution in the form of increase in the prices of nontradables takes 
place only in the first period. Therefore, agents P offer tax rate 1 in the first period and 
prefer to delay the repayment of external debt to the second period in order to increase 
the prices of nontradables as much as possible. Moreover, agents P propose the highest 
possible domestic debt that can be paid by the agents M in the second period.  
)1(max r
RY
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Given these proposals, in pair-wise competition, offer of the agents R beats other 
offers. Agents M prefer the proposal of agents R over the proposal of agents P because it 
offers zero tax rate instead of one. Agents P prefer the proposal of agents R even though 
it contains zero tax rate in the first period, it is better than the proposal of agents M at 
least it provides a rise in the prices of nontradables to the extent that can be repaid by 
agents M in the second period along with postponed external debt. At the end, agent R 
and agents P form a winning coalition and set the agenda as:  
t1= t2=0, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax,  PNO- PN=Dmax/b 
Under these circumstances, we observe delay of stabilization. Exchange rate is 
devaluated in the second period and the external debt payment is postponed to the second 
period with an even costly borrowing in the first period.  
Case II with Case III: 
b
M
NY > 
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY < 
a
R
TY  
Agents M benefit from redistribution more than the cost of taxation. Therefore 
agents M offer tax rate 1 in the first period. However agents M want the entire debt 
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obligation to be completed in the first period. Otherwise they bear all the burden of debt 
payment in the second period. Therefore they make the following proposal:  
t1= 1, t2= 0, R1=R, R2=0, D=0 
Agents R make the following offer discussed above:  
t1=0, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax 
Similarly, agents P have the same offer as before.  
t1=1, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax 
Agents P prefer the proposal of agents M if 
b
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LHS of inequality indicates the amount of appreciation due to accepting the offer of 
agents M. RHS of inequality denotes the appreciation due to accepting the offer of agents 
R.  
Agents M prefer the proposal of agents P because at least agents P offer tax rate 1 instead 
of 0. Agents R prefer the proposal of agents P because set of offers on external debt and 
domestic debt are same as the offer of agents P, only difference is the tax rate and agents 
M also offer the same tax rate, therefore it is better for agents R to accept the proposal of 
agents P. Therefore proposal of agents P beats the other proposals with the following 
agenda.  
t1=1, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax , 
b
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In the second period, agents M constitute the majority and their offer of zero tax rate in 
the second period is in effect. We observe again delay of reforms in the sense of 
devaluation of currency and postponement of the debt obligations with increased 
borrowing in the first period.  
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Case I with Case IV: 
b
M
NY <
a
M
TY  and 
b
R
NY > 
a
R
TY  
Agents M lose from redistribution, thus they want minimum redistribution 
possible. They also want all the tax to be paid in the first period to avoid debt burden later 
in the absence of agents R. Therefore agents M make the following offer: 
t1= t1 (R), R1=R, R2=0, D=0 
t1 (R) represents the tax rate just enough to pay external debt R.  
Agents R want to pay tax because the net benefit of redistribution is positive for 
agents R. They want also to postpone the external debt repayment to the second period. 
However, they are willing to lend to the government with an interest rate r. Therefore 
they make the following offer:    
 t1=1, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax, b
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max+=−  
Agents P again try to maximize the prices of nontradables in the first period and 
make the following offer: 
t1=1, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax, b
Da
PP N
O
N
max+=−  
The proposal of agents R and P are same and therefore their offer is accepted by 
majority voting. In this case again, the debt repayment is postponed with an additional 
borrowing in the first period and exchange rate devaluation at the end.  
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TABLE: 2 
The rich  leave in the second 
period 
Delay of debt payment 
Domestic borrowing 
Exchange rate devaluation 
Case III: 
b
R
NY < 
a
R
TY   Case IV: 
b
R
NY > 
a
R
TY  
Case I: 
b
M
NY < 
a
M
TY  
rich-poor coalition 
proposal of the rich wins 
devaluation in the second period 
t1= 0, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax,   
b
D
PP N
O
N
max=−  
 
rich-poor coalition 
proposal of the rich and poor  
wins 
devaluation in the second 
period 
t1=1, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax, 
b
Da
PP N
O
N
max+=−  
Case II: 
b
M
NY > 
a
M
TY  
rich-poor coalition 
proposal of the poor wins 
devaluation in the second period 
t1=1, R1=0, R2=R, D=Dmax, 
b
Da
PP N
O
N
max+=−  
 
Impossible 
 
Proposition IV: when the rich and middle class receive most of their income from 
tradables, there is less incentive for appreciation of currency in the first period and 
delay of debt repayment. 
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Proof: Consider Case I and Case III, devaluation in the second period is less as compared 
to other cases when share of nontradables for agents M or R is greater than the share of 
tradables.  
This proposition is extremely valid for countries receiving high income from 
tradable goods (high export). Those countries tend not to appreciate their currency for the 
fear of reduction in their income. This fact may stem from the structure of the economy 
in which the rich and middle class receive most of their income from tradable goods. 
7. Income Inequality, Overvaluation of Currency and Delay of Stabilization 
The economy experiences less exchange rate fluctuation and delay of debt 
obligations if all the individuals stay in the country in the second period. Hence, anything 
that increases the likelihood of leaving the country in the second period is welfare 
reducing for the economy in general. When nobody leaves the country, external stock of 
debt is repaid in two periods equally, which is closer to the optimal case. Moreover, if 
individuals do not leave the country, we observe less exchange rate fluctuations with no 
domestic borrowing and even there is some domestic debt it is less than the domestic debt 
when some agents leave the country. Given these observations, we can conclude that any 
progress that increases the individuals’ probability of leaving generates unsustainable 
exchange rate arrangements and postponement of consolidation with further borrowing. 
Hence, financial liberalization may have negative long-term consequences for developing 
countries if it gives flexibility to the rich to move their productive resources abroad.   
We will first approach the increasing income inequality from this perspective and 
analyze the effect of widening income inequality on individuals’ decision to leave the 
country in the second period. Then we consider the effect of income inequality on 
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different winning coalitions and show that increasing inequality can lead to shift of 
coalitions such that the economy ends up with highly volatile exchange rates and delay of 
necessary reforms to stabilize the economy. Before that however, following proposition 
points out the distinction between rich and poor countries. The delay of debt repayment 
and overvaluation of domestic currency is more likely to be seen in poor countries with 
less productivity as compared to the rest of the world.  
Proposition V: If a country is poor (less productive) as compared to the rest of the 
world, 1≥A  then the rich in this country have more incentive to leave the country in 
the second period and subsequently, the country has less stable exchange rate with 
delay of debt repayment. Opposite holds for the rich (more productive) countries. 
Proof: The rich do not leave the country in the second period if the following inequality 
is satisfied:  
fAYDRtY RT
R
T −≥+− )](1[ 22  
LHS denotes the income received by the rich if they do not leave the country and RHS 
indicates the income net of fixed cost of leaving the country in the second period. 
Therefore probability of leaving the country is a function of following variables: 
fADRtY RT ,)],(, 22 + . It is clear that probability of leaving the country increases as A 
increases: 0
},)],(,{ 22 ≥∂
+∂
A
fADRtYP RT  
Hence as the rest of the world becomes more productive (richer) or equivalently the 
country becomes less productive (poorer), the rich are more likely to leave the country. 
Consequently, as the rich leave the country, the economy is characterized with 
devaluations and delay of debt repayment.  
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Since in the model there are two types of goods, change in income inequality is 
attributable to change in relative ownership of tradables and nontradables. To keep the 
matters simple, deterioration in income inequality is introduced as an increase in tradable 
endowment of the rich while keeping the total tradable endowment of the country fixed.  
Since we assume mean preserving spread in the tradables, increasing the endowments of 
tradables for agents R indicates lower share of tradables for agents M. 
Proposition VI: Higher income inequality in the form of higher endowment of 
tradables of the rich can induce the rich to leave the country in the second period and 
lead to overvaluation of currency and delay of debt repayment in the first period.  
Proof: Agents R do not leave the country if the following inequality is satisfied: 
fAYDRtY RT
R
T −≥+− )](1[ 22  
where )( 22 DRt + is the tax rate needed in the second period to pay the external and 
domestic. Higher income inequality in the form of increasing RTY  can reverse this 
inequality depending on the fixed cost of moving and productivity factor A. An increase 
in RTY
 effects both side of the equation, however if A is greater than )](1[ 22 DRt +−  then 
RHS of inequality grows faster than LHS  and this in turn leads to a reversal of above 
inequality in the existence of fixed cost of moving. Therefore, higher inequality in the 
form of increasing RTY  induces agents R to leave the country in the long run and 
eventually worse economic policies with delay of consolidation can be adopted in the 
first period.  
For higher values of A, country is considered to be less productive and poorer as 
compared to the rest of the world. Hence, the model predicts more capital outflow for 
poor countries with high inequality, a feature consistent with actual experiences of many 
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developing countries. Moreover, even though both countries are poor, we expect less 
capital flight in the country with better income distribution.  
To illustrate the delayed stabilization and overvalued exchange rate with rise in 
inequality, consider that case I with III prevails and nobody leaves the country in the 
second period then higher share of tradable income for the rich and lower share for the 
middle class in mean preserving sense shifts the economy from case III with possible 
combinations of case I or case II and agents R leave the country in the second period. 
Eventually, all the external debt repayment is postponed to the second period, domestic 
borrowing increases in the first period with possibly more devaluation in the second 
period.  
8. Impact of Financial Frictions on Coalition Formation of the Rich and the Poor 
An interesting implication of the model is is that the rich and the poor form 
coalition to appreciate the currency and delay the debt repayment at the expense of the 
middle class. Hence, a country can adopt inefficient policies that benefit certain coalitions 
of agents and harm the rest of the population. In this model, the poor benefit from 
appreciation of currency and delay of debt repayment because these provide income 
redistribution in favor of the poor. The rich, on the other hand benefit from the delay of 
debt repayment because they leave the country and are not exposed to taxation in the 
second period.  
This model seems to be realistic for types of developing countries where the rich 
own more mobile forms of production and income. For example, if the rich earn their 
income through lending their existing stock of capital, then it is quite reasonable to 
encounter that the rich leave the country and invest abroad avoiding the burden of 
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stabilization in the second period. This mechanism can be prevalent especially after the 
financial liberalizations that provide more flexibility to the owners of more mobile factors 
of production. That’s why we confront with higher capital flight in financially liberalized 
economies as the citizens of those countries also shift their capital abroad after major 
crises.  
It is hard, however, to imagine that the rich leave the country with their 
productive resources. In our model, the rich only shift their tradable income abroad and 
keep the nontradable income in home country. This is a realistic case given that 
governments do not want to impose taxes on nontradables after the crises to avoid too 
many job losses. Even in some cases, governments bailout the NT sectors like 
construction not to increase the unemployment.  
A possible extension of the model is to consider the financial frictions. The rich 
now benefit from appreciation of currency and delay of debt repayment due to relaxation 
of financial constraints in the first period. It is widely accepted that financial frictions 
play an enormous role on the evolution of business cycles in developing countries [Aysan 
(2006)]. Financial frictions can be incorporated into the model such that it rationalizes the 
poor-rich coalition better. This modified model still assumes that the poor receive their 
income from nontradables and thus prefer to inflate the prices of nontradables. On the 
other hand, instead of assuming that the rich leave the country in the second period, the 
model with financial frictions allow the rich to borrow in international financial markets 
which is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the government. To this end, we assume 
that only the rich have access to the international financial markets and international 
investors employ collateral constraints to screen the borrowers. A rise in the prices of 
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nontradables increases the collateral value of the rich in the first period such that the rich 
can borrow the following additional amount of debt in the first period: 
RR
N
R
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O
N BYYP =− )(θ  
Where 1≥ONP denotes the overvalued prices of nontradables. The actual price of 
nontradables is normalized to 1. θ  is parameter indicating that the rich can borrow 
additional amount in international markets.  
Since the rich are assumed to give their T and NT income as collateral, only way 
to increase the borrowing from international markets is to raise the prices of nontradables 
so that their collateral value increases too. In the second period, all the private and public 
debt of the country is repaid and no further borrowing takes place. Hence, the domestic 
currency converges to its steady state with devaluation. The collateral value of the rich 
given in the first period to borrow additional debt is lost with devaluation in the second 
period. Then, government comes in and pays the additional borrowing, RB to the 
international investors. Hence, the rich benefit from this process as much as RB and like 
to form a coalition with the poor to inflate the prices of nontradables and delay the debt 
repayment in the first period as long as the following holds: RT
RR
N
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LHS denotes the amount of additional loan received by the rich in the first period, which 
is later paid by the government. RHS denotes the total tax paid by the rich in the second 
period. Therefore in the existence of financial frictions like collateral constraint and 
bailout guarantees, the rich have an incentive to appreciate the currency and delay the 
debt repayments.  
 This modified model is more relevant for the poor countries with weak financial 
institutions. It is apparent that collateral constraints with moral hazard associated with 
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bailout guarantees are more prevalent in the poor countries. On the contrary, the rich 
countries are immune to these cycles given their well-developed financial markets and 
strong institutions.  
9. Conclusion  
This paper provides a model to explain some of the regularities of stabilization 
programs experienced by many developing countries in recent decades. The model draws 
attention on the role of income shares of different groups in various types of goods. These 
different goods are categorized as tradables and nontradables. In practice, individuals 
earn their income from various types of goods. Hence, since stabilization programs 
generate changes in the relative prices of the goods traded in the country, individuals are 
not affected symmetrically by the introduction of new stabilization programs. Our model 
suggests that these heterogeneous impacts of stabilization policies lead to formation of 
various coalitions over the evolution of stabilization programs. These coalitions produce 
unsustainable economic policies at the expense of other groups in the economy. In our 
model, we categorize these various groups with respect to their shares in total production 
of tradables and nontradables. Moreover, in the model, an increase in the relative prices 
of nontradables benefits the poor more than the rich and middle classes. In addition to the 
poor, the rich benefit from unsustainable macroeconomic polices by lending to the 
government and eventually escaping the cost of stabilization in the long run, because they 
control more mobile factors of production like capital as opposed to labor. Under 
majority voting, the poor and rich form a coalition and pass decisions rendering the 
unsustainable economic policies that benefit them at the expense of the middle class. This 
interplay of different groups helps the model produce a pattern of devaluations, delay of 
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debt repayment and costly domestic borrowing which is absent under homogeneous 
agents settings. The overvaluation of exchange rate is used as a mechanism to redistribute 
the income among different types of agents. This aspect of the model explains the high 
exchange rate volatility in poor and highly unequal economies.  
Later, the model focuses on the role of income inequality for unsustainable 
policies like overvalued currency, further borrowing in addition to existing stock of debt 
and show that delay of stabilizations occurs more likely in poor and unequal economies, a 
feature that seems to be consistent with a number of empirical studies.  
The results of the model are supported by some empirical studies. First, the poor 
and unequal societies accumulated large external debt in the past [see Berg and Sachs 
(1988)], The main political support for the continuation of stabilization programs comes 
mainly from coalition of workers, low-income individuals and the association of 
industrialist. Berg and Sachs (1988) also point out the following observation consistent 
with our model “the maintenance of realistic exchange rates and balanced budgets is 
probably more difficult, the greater the income inequality” 
The model also provides a link between income inequality and growth. The model 
predicts that higher income inequality along with unequal income shares of the 
individuals in tradables and nontradables induces a political mechanism that creates a 
delay in necessary stabilizations. Therefore, income inequality first effects the formation 
of new political coalitions among different types of individuals and these new coalitions 
later can hinder the adoption of needed policy changes on a timely basis.  
This political economy model contributes the literature by showing the 
importance of distributional consequences of stabilization programs and suggests that 
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often failed stabilization programs can be improved by giving more attention to the 
distributional aspects of alternative policies and corresponding reactions of different 
groups to these policies.  
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